Organize forums for U.S-China dialogue on civilizational matters
IV. UMBRELLA IDEAS FOR FOSTERING A CONSILIENT COEXISTENCE, cont.
[This is either my final or next-to-last post about ideas for advancing a consilient U.S.-China coexistence. It’s mostly an abridged iteration of points I made last year in “Two Civilization-States At Odds: Time For A New Kind Of Dialogue” (2024), plus a few new points I’ve come up with since then.
If I can manage to stay on this track, and not get attracted to immediately switch to another track, I have one more post I’d like to add to this series — a personal concluding comment as Part V about how and why I’ve happened to write temporarily about China and U.S.-China relations, and what it may mean for future progress with TIMN, NOO, CYBOC, and STAC.]
#8. Promote forums for dialogue on civilizational matters?
China is aggressively on the move not only as a nation-state but also as a civilization and “civilization-state.” Beijing apparently aims to overlay the conventional nation-state framework of world order with a civilization-state framework — not to forsake or supersede the former, but rather to fashion a new layer atop and alongside to help spread China’s rising influence. China means to present itself as a world-class civilization while denying it has imperial designs and wants to restore itself as an empire.
More striking than Beijing’s civilizational turn is the lack of response from U.S. experts on China and U.S-China relations. But for a few exceptions, they have roundly disregarded and dismissed it. Which I, as a non-expert, find puzzling, since “civilizationism” is no minor pose.. It’s China’s long-planned strategic response to Frank Fukuyama’s “end of history” and Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theses — a response that China’s fellow civilizationists in Russia, India, Iran, and Turkey are likewise adopting
I’m sensitive about this because I happen to like civilization stuff — lots of it, all levels and areas, and for personal appreciation and enjoyment as well as for analytical reasons. Those nightcap music pieces I’ve ended my posts with lately — they’re all excellent expressions of civilization, as are the fine Scotch and Irish whiskeys I nightcap with. So, while I much prefer Mexico’s contributions to culture and civilization, I perk up when Chinese leaders laud civilization and deploy the concept for strategic advantage. I see openings for consilience-seeking that are being ignored.
China’s campaign as a proponent of civilization
While Xi Jinping has not personally termed China a “civilization-state,” he has long praised China’s history and importance as a civilization. In 2015 he began calling for “inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences.” And in 2023 he launched China’s Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Chinese officials are gaining influence with it in the Global South, particularly in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, and with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Earlier Chinese initiatives for a worldwide “community of common destiny” are being folded into the GCI.
Beijing looks set to emphasize civilizational themes for years to come — on occasion overtly and showily, but often slowly and stealthily. Indeed, the GCI reads quite invitingly. Far from fretting about a “clash of civilizations” or the “end of history,” it calls for achieving coexistence and confluence through inter-civilizational dialogue. In the GCI’s rosy view, no civilization is superior to others; none ranks higher or lower. In the past, Western colonizers were wrong to claim civilizational superiority and seek hegemony; in the future, no single universal model of civilization should exist. What should grow is a “garden” of civilizations, as all parties work together to “build a community of shared future.” The GCI favors respecting the diversity of civilizations and tolerating all development paths people choose. It calls for upholding principles of equality, equity, justice, non-interference, inclusivity, harmony, and “democracy and freedom” among civilizations. It aims to strengthen people-to-people exchanges, mutual learning, dialogue, and cooperation among all civilizations. (See Xi, 2023; State Council Information Office, 2023.)
In the words of a leading Chinese historian and politician, Gao Xiang (2023), the GCI affirms the principle of “harmony without uniformity” that China has upheld “throughout its 5,000-year history.” Moreover, the GCI amounts to “a new international public good” — something Xi has criticized Washington for failing to provide.
At the same time, other authoritarian states in Eurasia, the Middle East, and South Asia — notably Russia, India, Iran, and Turkey — have joined with China to mount a collective campaign to assert civilizational identities and statuses. And it’s quite a biased push, for the meanings they give to their civilizational ideas favor traditional over modern values, autocratic over democratic systems, and transnational reach over staying within boundaries — all in vociferous opposition to Western values and principles. In their views, America is in decline and barely qualifies as a civilization, much less a civilization-state.
I’m not sure whether Beijing or Moscow first decided to make civilization a theme for policy and strategy. Both began moving in this direction a decade or two ago. Xi may have spoken up first, but Vladimir Putin has been a vocal proponent for the past few years, particularly since invading Ukraine.
I’m relieved to have come across a recent article by historian Paul Robinson on “The Rise of Russian Civilizationism” (2025), for it parallels points I’ve been trying to make about China that I once figured U.S. experts on China would have made by now:
“The use of civilizational rhetoric may be seen as a strategy to combat the West’s ideological hegemony and to win hearts and minds in the non-Western world by defending the rights of different societies to develop in their own way and thus to resist pressure to conform with Western norms. …
“Civilizationism denies that there is a single end to history. Instead of civilization, singular, there are civilizations, plural, and history consists of each of them progressing in its own distinct way towards its own distinct future. …
“This civilizational discourse appears to serve two political purposes. The first is domestic – it helps to consolidate national identity; the second is foreign – civilizationism serves as a means by which Russia can exercise soft power and win the support of the Global South, and so prevent the West from diplomatically isolating Russia. …
“Russia is exploiting this sentiment by allying civilizational rhetoric with references to the Soviet Union’s role in supporting anti-colonialism, thereby suggesting that Russia and the Global South are allies in a joint struggle against Western attempts to eliminate civilizational differences and impose a form of neocolonialism. …
“Western states demand diversity within societies. Civilizationism challenges them to accept diversity between societies as well.”
To conclude his article, Robinson offers a forewarning about Russia that I think should be offered about China:
“The collapse in Russian-Western relations is not ideological in origin. Nonetheless, the tensions between the two have taken on an ideological dimension, with Russia promoting civilizationism as a means of legitimizing its position in the eyes of the non-Western world. Arguably, this is proving quite successful. The West won the ideological battle of the first Cold War. It’s not obvious as yet that it will have the same success this time around.”
Apart from Robinson’s article, U.S. experts on Russia have not shown much (any?) interest in this civilizational turn; U.S. experts on both Russia and China appear to be dismissing it. Nonetheless, Russia under Putin seems too derelict as a source of civilizational energy, and too medieval as a civilization-state, for a consilience-seeking dialogue to be possible. In contrast, I continue to see possibilities with China.
Civilization and civilization-states in recent perspectives
As I traced last year (Ronfeldt, 2024), the civilization-state concept began to gain traction over a decade ago, mainly in regard to China. According to what I’ve read, “civilizations” are defined mainly by their cultural contents, and “civilization-states” are states that embody and represent a civilization — meaning their domains may sprawl beyond a state’s territorial boundaries. In keeping with this cultural emphasis, collective identity trumps individual identity; spiritual values are more defining than ideology; and heritage and tradition matter mightily. Thus, in Beijing’s view, Taiwan belongs under China’s civilization-state, as may Chinese immigrant communities in other countries.
Of course, more than a strong culture is necessary for a state to grow into a civilization-state. Military prowess is normally a foremost factor too. As art historian Kenneth Clark noted decades ago in his landmark work Civilisation: A Personal View (1969), “All great civilizations, in their early stages, are based on success in war.” Yet spiritual, religious, and other cultural energies may matter more in the end. As British historian Christopher Dawson wrote in his classic on Progress and Religion: An Historical Inquiry (1929), “Every living culture must possess some spiritual dynamic, which provides the energy necessary for that sustained social effort which is civilization.” China fits that analysis, and Beijing is now intent on reenergizing its Confucian heritage to suit future growth purposes.
Thus, while empires and nations are mainly geopolitical entities, civilizations are equally noöpolitical entities. For claiming the mantle of a civilization-state is about expressing noopolitical grandeur along with material power. It means that a claimant’s sense of authority is so well-deserved for cultural reasons that its impulses and prerogatives merit respect and obedience throughout its sphere of influence.
Cultural sovereignty is considered one of those prerogatives. While a civilization may not claim juridical sovereignty over its cultural reaches, a civilization-state may claim cultural sovereignty. Chinese writings about civilizational matters have long stressed the importance of “cultural sovereignty” and “cultural security” — especially to defend against Western influences (Wang, 1994).
Thus, civilization-minded leaders are advised to insist on social cohesion and solidarity around a central ethos. They must constantly strive to reconcile unity with diversity and variety, especially in regional areas with strong sub-cultures. This has long been a crucial concern for China’s leaders, today in particular, since China is such a “a patchwork of linguistic, cultural, religious, and political identities, often defined by centuries of uneasy tension” (Baron & Furchtgott, 2025). (Russia’s narratives and concerns are similarly loaded, as I suppose are India’s, Iran’s, and Turkey’s.)
I’ve not found much discussion to clarify how empire-states, nation-states, and civilization-states are different from each other. It seems a foregone conclusion that, if given a choice, people would generally prefer civilization to empire. But the differences are fuzzy, and it’s not difficult to suppose that some proponents of civilization may want empire too — that talk of civilization may camouflage a longing for empire.
Thus, civilization looks like a stirring topic for policy and strategy, as does the next level up — planetary governance. If we are to seek coexistence with China, the future of civilizations and civilization-states seems more forward-looking and congenial as an umbrella theme than does the future of empires or nations and their respective kinds of states.
Challenges for U.S. national-security strategy and strategists
By elevating civilization as a strategic concept, China is giving it a status it’s rarely been given. I’d say it’s time to raise questions about how civilizations and civilization-states are defined, and how their elevation may affect world order. I’d also say it’s time to propose new programs and projects that may advance consilience-seeking under a civilizational umbrella.
Lately it’s become evident that U.S. strategists overplayed the likelihood of China becoming liberal and democratic a couple decades ago. Now they appear to be underplaying the significance of China’s civilizational turn. A potential opportunity is being overlooked, especially if the goal is long-term coexistence. Pro-civilization dialogue with China might open new avenues for rerouting some tensions, probing to identify prospects and principles for future coexistence and consilience, and engaging on selected ideas.
That said, opening a pro-civilization dialogue does not look doable right now. China already appears to have a suite of policy-oriented analysts who could engage on civilizational matters in civilizational terms — but I see no signs Beijing may be interested. In contrast, civilizational expertise is sorely lacking on the U.S. side — insufficient for extended dialogue — and Washington shows no interest anyway. As for non-governmental entities, the Berggruen Institute and its affiliate, Noēma magazine, are making insightful efforts to advance in this direction, but they’re the only ones I know of.
Nonetheless, civilizational (and broader planetary governance) themes seem likely to grow in importance whether the world becomes more conflictive or peaceable in the years ahead. It’s advisable to quietly begin developing low-key programs and projects in order to become adept at civilizational analysis and dialogue from American perspectives. For a while this may mean playing catch-up.
Matters pending for civilizational analysis and dialogue
Suppose a dialogue could be developed. What then might U.S. participants want to include, clarify, or propose? I’d include the six ideas I raised in Part III. I’d also include the ideas that China and its fellow civilizationists push, e.g., their claims that civilizations favor traditional over modern values, autocratic over democratic systems, and cultural reach over staying within boundaries — contrary to what they claim are Western values and principles. Plus, I’d include their claims that America is in decline and barely qualifies as a civilization, much less a civilization-state.
Civilization and civilization-state concepts are more unsettled — more open to question — than Beijing and its fellow proponents have asserted. Some of their underlying assumptions await challenge and correction — preferably in consilience-seeking ways, but in declamatory debate if not. If a series of consilience-seeking forums could be organized, here are some narrative lines I’d suggest exploring. Most I’ve mentioned before (Ronfeldt, 2024).
— “High civilization” isn’t the only level that matters: So far, China’s pro-civilization theorists and strategists have had only “high civilization” in mind. That’s the level their leaders always laud (likewise civilization-state aspirants elsewhere). Chinese views of civilization seem entirely top-down and hierarchical, bound up with their classic ideas about tianxia (“all under heaven”) as a hegemonic ordering principle for China and the world at large.
Yet there is far more to civilizations than “high civilization” — their “low” and “popular” levels are vital too. Civilizations become and remain great by having both radiant high cultures and lively low cultures, along with fruitful interconnections and interactions across all levels and fields. Great civilizations may also draw sideways from other cultures and civilizations. No great civilization is entirely self-made; many benefit from functioning as “crossroads” (Turkey) and “melting-pots” (America). Authoritarian leaders may claim that their particular civilization is unique and unitary; but variety and diversity are bound to be core dynamics, even if suppressed.
If U.S. strategists ever engage with China on civilizational matters, they should insist that civilizations be viewed holistically and dynamically. They should argue that civilizations not only have hierarchical dynamics, but also tribal, market, and network dynamics. For example, American civilization benefits from Sotheby’s high-end marketing activities, but it benefits even more from Etsy’s and eBay’s middle- and lower-end activities. By accurately arguing how and why civilizations are express themselves over time, U.S. strategists may then do better at calling for dialogue about associated matters such as the significance of variety, diversity, inclusivity, tolerance, and freedom.
— American civilization is far from falling: Chinese theorists have long taken a keen interest in analyzing why civilizations rise and fall (likewise, great powers). They have read the same classics and new studies that Western theorists read, along with studies written by China’s own historians. They’ve given special attention to assessing why the Soviet Union collapsed. They’ve come up with key findings for policy and strategy: e.g., be on the forefront of advanced science and technology, assure ideological constancy and solidarity. Plus, they’ve provided arguments for government and party leaders to sustain that China is re-emerging as a great civilization and major world power — and that America is in decline and coming apart, not only as a society but also as a civilization.
If a civilization dialogue develops with China, U.S. participants will need to be proficient in civilizational discourse and analysis, including theories about their rise and fall, and about laws and principles of evolution that Chinese theorists tend to emphasize. I can think of only a few Americans who seem ready for that — mostly in think-tanks and academia, but none in government. Preparing for such a dialogue would not be an easy task.
Beyond listing “decline” for attention, I have little guidance to offer. But I do want to warn against one pessimistic theory that often comes up in discussions about whether or not America is in decline: Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988). It’s still a classic must-read, mostly for his argument that advances in complexity may improve a society’s problem-solving capacities, but that “investment in sociopolitical complexity as a problem-solving response often reaches a point of declining marginal returns” — then a society may cease to progress and head for collapse.
But his model doesn’t distinguish between complexity and complicatedness — in some places, it says complexity is increasing when it’s complicatedness that’s increasing, not complexity. Plus, it barely recognize that the rise of new forms of organization — in particular, TIMN’s four forms — leads to major increases in complexity. All of which means there is a way out of the spiral of collapse for which his theory is famous.
As a society progresses over time, the problems it faces can become too complicated for its existing level of complexity to resolve — particularly if that progress is what has generated those new problems. That might lead to Tainter-type collapse. But if this occurs in an era when a new form of organization and an energizing new information technology are emerging conjointly, and if actors within that society are adept at figuring out how to use the new form and technology, then that society, instead of collapsing, may undergo a major evolutionary transition to a next-level complexity that brings increased “marginal returns” for quite some time.
According to TIMN, that has repeatedly occurred with the progressions from monoform (T-based), to biform (T+I), to today’s triform (T+I+M) societies; and it will re-occur with the emergence of quadriform (T+I+M+N) societies — and, I should add, civilizations. This evolutionary pattern is overlooked in Tainter’s model (not to mention other theories and models). Yet it may be what’s starting to occur in America with the ongoing rise of +N factors and forces.
In short, our society’s aging triform design may be headed for collapse, but not necessarily our culture’s civilizational energies and impulses. We may be experiencing the early birth pangs of a needed transition to a quadriform system, as I’ve discussed in other posts. Whether the American people are up to it is a different question. The Trump administration isn’t — in may ways it’s reverting to medieval biform (T+I) ways of thinking and behaving, neglecting the damage being done to our democratic market (+M) ways.
— Dynamic civilizations favor both traditional and modern values: I’ve seen claims, both as criticism and praise, that civilization-states look to the deep past more than the present and future. But that’s not axiomatic. Great civilizations always honor the past, draw inspiration from it, and tout bygone glory and grandeur. Yet the advanced ones also inevitably endeavor to be exemplary engines of future progress, even models for others to follow. Thus Western ideas of civilization and progress grew conjointly in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Today, China’s leaders are re-invigorating ancient Confucian concepts in order to thrust forward and outward more energetically than ever. Their efforts are decidedly future-oriented, aiming to offer new models for future progress.
Of course, this emphasis on having a deep past full of heritage and tradition is meant to slight America’s relatively-young status as a civilization. But there are many ways to defend and advance America’s status that U.S. participants in a dialogue would surely know to table. Whether today’s Washington deserves the status of a civilization-state is another matter.
— More topics for civilizational dialogue: Hopefully, those few narrative lines suffice to make a preliminary case for civilizational dialogue. If not, I certainly have more topics and narrative lines I could list, for example:
o How about discussing what to do with “benighted legacies” that taint every civilization’s history? Say, where/when minority ethnic groups and/or sub-cultures are violently repressed and cover-ups ensue. Plenty of that in both China’s and America’s background.
o How about trying to identify metrics for measuring civilizational energy and/or vitality? These metrics would surely have to be cultural in nature. I’m not aware that has been done before; most metrics are about political, economic, and social matters. Might be interesting to try. My guess is that America and China would do fine. Russia would not.
o How about agreeing to formulate ideas in planetary terms? China regularly criticizes Western ideas and Western values. Americans and others refer to Asian ideals, Asian values, and Asian ways of looking at the world the world. Some actors are now touting Eurasian values in contrast to Western values. Major cognitive and cultural differences do exist — and they’ll continue to do so. Yet, if civilizational forums are held, shouldn’t there be some analysis and discussion to find ways to accomplish a “planetization” of ideas? As though a time may come when Westernization and Easternization are off the table.
— Challenge of clarifying what words really mean: Throughout my efforts to read up on China, I’ve found that key concepts whose American meaning is known to me may mean something significantly different but not entirely overt when wielded by a Chinese user. In preceding posts, I’ve noted that China means something different by “democracy” than Americans do, and that China’s view of “coexistence” rejects “competition” (per Levine (2025), whereas Americans may assume the two are compatible. In this post, I’ve noted that each side differs in its views of “civilization” as well as “civilizational values” and “universal values.”
Now I learn from a new article by Abram Shulsky (2025) that, in China’s view, “partnerships” are good but “alliances” are something else. He quotes Xi Jinping to make this point. In Xi’s words,
“We call on the people of all countries to work together to build a community with a shared future for mankind, to build an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. We should respect each other, discuss issues as equals, resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics, and take a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication, not confrontation, and with partnership, not alliance.” (Xi, 2017)
Shulsky’s sharp analysis warily comments that,
“It is easy to dismiss this as woolly-headed rhetoric; but one key is the rejection of alliances. (‘Partnership in the Chinese lexicon involves cooperation in general but excludes cooperation against a common threat.) Along with the rejection of the ‘Cold War mentality,’ this notion of ‘community’ tilts the scale in favor of a big country like China: its smaller neighbors may not form a defensive alliance. In other words, although all countries are formally equal, in practice, one will be bigger and more powerful than the other and can be expected to come out on top in any negotiation. If China believes it is destined to become the world’s most powerful nation, then the extension of this ‘community’ to all mankind would cement China’s preeminent status.”
Sound analysis and sage advice, I’d say. In addition, his quote provides another good reminder that China’s positions are full of language that looks compatible with American values and norms — yet are actually designed to refute U.S. positions. How do we deal with that if we ever convene for consilience-seeking purposes?
Looking farther ahead, speculatively
I have two final suggestions for civilizational dialogue if forum discussions are open to long-range future speculations:
— How about founding a planetary civilization forum?: If bilateral efforts to engage in pro-civilizational dialogue went well, how about eventually proposing to co-found a new entity to advance civilization worldwide? Say something like a Forum For Civilizational Analysis And Dialogue, or a Planetary Civilizations Forum, for discussing and proposing how to develop co-existent civilizations on a planetary scale? How about filling this entity more with cultural than political and economic leaders? With panels consisting of cultural theorists, scientists, and strategists? How about having it foster “commonwealths of the mind” (and prevent “empires of the mind” that Winston Churchill once forecast in 1941)? In other words, take Xi up on his calls since 2015 for “inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences” — then look for ways to go beyond them.
Such dialogues have been proposed before at the United Nations (UN), but they never matured. Perhaps U.S. and Chinese actors working together could someday do better at founding a pro-civilization entity of planetary dimensions outside of established nation-state frameworks like the UN. China is already moving in this direction with other nations. It hosted with Greece an inaugural World Conference of Classics in 2024 whose purpose was to develop “a platform for exploring the modern value of classical civilizations, … while also promoting exchanges and mutual learning as well as new developments in global civilization” (Wu & Langchen, 2024).
— Even farther out, how about a post-Westphalian treaty?: Suppose civilization-state entities do take hold in the decades ahead, and civilizational interactions do become a constant concern. Might it then be time to propose a Peace of Singapore or a Peace of Brasilia for civilization-states, as a successor to the Peace of Westphalia treaty of 1648 that authorized sovereignty for nation-states?
Whereas Westphalia was about nation-states living together by setting boundaries, this new treaty could be about civilization-states coexisting by transcending boundaries — perhaps reflecting a maxim such as “Do unto your planet as you would have the planet do do unto you.”
Closing caveat
Of course, all my suggestions will be moot, off the table, if China opts to invade Taiwan or something else results in a U.S.-China shooting war.
REFERENCES
Baron, Jonathan M., and Jeremy B. Furchtgott, “To Counter Beijing, Try a ‘Many Chinas’ Policy,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2025, online at:
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/to-counter-beijing-try-a-many-chinas-policy-diverse-regions-f32e83c0
Gao Xiang, “Unveiling the Laws of the Rise and Fall of Civilizations, and Mapping the Path of Civilizational Development — The Theoretical Implications and Practical Value of the Global Civilization Initiative,” CSIS Interpret, 2023, online at:
https://interpret.csis.org/translations/unveiling-the-laws-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-civilizations-and-mapping-the-path-of-civilizational-development-the-theoretical-implications-and-practical-value-of-the-global-civilization-initiat/
Robinson, Paul, “The Rise of Russian Civilizationism,” Russia.Post, April 28, 2025, online at:
https://russiapost.info/politics/russian_civilizationism
Ronfeldt, David, “Two Civilization-States At Odds,” Onward With TIMN … STAC, NOO, and CYBOC too, blog, July 27, 2024, online at:
https://davidronfeldt.substack.com/p/two-civilization-states-at-odds
Shulsky, Abram, “Into the Multi(polar)verse: A new world order is emerging,” Persuasion, (blog), April 7, 2025, online at:
State Council Information Office, A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions, September 2023, online at:
https://english.news.cn/20230926/689e17beb34c44e6a41aead2e0475223/20230926689e17beb34c44e6a41aead2e0475223_XxjwshE007016_20230926_CBMFN0A001.docx
Tainter, Joseph A., The Collapse of Complex Societies, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988, online at:
Wang Huning, “Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty: A Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty,” 1994, translated at Reading the China Dream, (blog), online at:
https://www.readingthechinadream.com/wang-huning-ldquocultural-expansion-and-cultural-sovereignty.html
Xi Jinping, “Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, October 18, 2017, online at:
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm
Xi Jinping, “Full text of Xi Jinping's keynote address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-level Meeting,” State Council Information Office, March 15, 2023, online at:
http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/16/content_85171478.htm
Wu Jie and Sun Langchen, “Scholars hail World Conference of Classics as milestone in history of studies,” Global Times, Nov 08, 2024, online at:
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1322726.shtml#
CODA: A LITTLE NIGHTCAP MUSIC
What a pairing: Lestor Young soars, Johnny Hodges romps — while I sip a fine Glenmorangie Single Malt 12 Year Lasanta Sherry Cask.
Count Basie Orchestra with Lester Young – “Taxi War Dance” (1939)
Duke Ellington Orchestra with Johnny Hodges – “Jeep’s Blues” (1956)
Onward.